Is Free Will Necessary for Moral Responsibility?: A Case for Rethinking Their Relationship and the Design of Experimental Studies in Moral Psychology

Mind and Language 30 (5):603-627 (2015)
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Abstract
Philosophical tradition has long held that free will is necessary for moral responsibility. We report experimental results that show that the folk do not think free will is necessary for moral responsibility. Our results also suggest that experimental investigation of the relationship is ill served by a focus on incompatibilism versus compatibilism. We propose an alternative framework for empirical moral psychology in which judgments of free will and moral responsibility can vary independently in response to many factors. We also suggest that, in response to some factors, the necessity relation may run from responsibility to free will
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References found in this work BETA
Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions About Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Nahmias, Eddy; Morris, Stephen; Nadelhoffer, Thomas & Turner, Jason
Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Turner, Jason; Nahmias, Eddy; Morris, Stephen & Nadelhoffer, Thomas
An Essay on Free Will.van Inwagen, Peter

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