Just Another Article on Moore’s Paradox, But We Don’t Believe That

Synthese 196 (12):5153-5167 (2019)
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We present counterexamples to the widespread assumption that Moorean sentences cannot be rationally asserted. We then explain why Moorean assertions of the sort we discuss do not incur the irrationality charge. Our argument involves an appeal to the dual-process theory of the mind and a contrast between the conditions for ascribing beliefs to oneself and the conditions for making assertions about independently existing states of affairs. We conclude by contrasting beliefs of the sort we discuss with the structurally similar but rationally impermissible beliefs of certain psychiatric patients.

Author Profiles

Iskra Fileva
University of Colorado, Boulder
L.A.W. Brakel
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor


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