There is tension between commonly held views concerning phenomenal imagery
on the one hand and our first-person epistemic access to it on the other. This tension is
evident in many individual issues and experiments in philosophy and psychology (e.g. inattentional and change blindness, the speckled hen, dream coloration, visual periphery). To dissolve it, we can give up either (i) that we lack full introspective access to the phenomenal properties of our imagistic experiences, or (ii) that phenomenal imagery is fully determined, or (iii) that phenomenal imagery does not exist.
Which option is preferable? I explore the feasibility of option (ii) in more details by
distinguishing between dierent kinds of indeterminacy. One of the most often proclaimed versions of indeterminacy is tied to Representationalism. However, I argue that in this context,
Representationalism appears to be the least satisfying option, for which I give ten reasons. By abduction, we should reject Representationalism in favour of (i) or (iii)—the most parsimonious option being eliminativism, and the most conservative being the rejection of privileged access. The decision between these two, however, should be made on a case-by-case basis, depending on which is most adequate given the data. I illustrate this with the comparison between visual agnosia and Charles-Bonnet-Syndrome.