Limiting Logical Pluralism

Synthese:1-19 (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In this paper I argue that pluralism at the level of logical systems requires a certain monism at the meta-logical level, and so, in a sense, there cannot be pluralism all the way down. The adequate alternative logical systems bottom out in a shared basic meta-logic, and as such, logical pluralism is limited. I argue that the content of this basic meta-logic must include the analogue of logical rules Modus Ponens (MP) and Universal Instantiation (UI). I show this through a detailed analysis of the ‘adoption problem’, which manifests something special about MP and UI. It appears that MP and UI underwrite the very nature of a logical rule of inference, due to all rules of inference being conditional and universal in their structure. As such, all logical rules presuppose MP and UI, making MP and UI self-governing, basic, unadoptable, and (most relevantly to logical pluralism) required in the meta-logic for the adequacy of any logical system.
Categories
PhilPapers/Archive ID
FINLLP-2
Upload history
First archival date: 2019-02-11
Latest version: 2 (2019-02-20)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2019-02-11

Total views
239 ( #20,901 of 54,388 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
55 ( #12,014 of 54,388 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.