Metametametaphysics and Dialetheism

Australasian Journal of Logic 14 (1):128-146 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper reflects on metametaphysics and as such develops a metametameta-physical view: that quietist metametaphysics requires dialetheism, and in turn a paraconsistent logic. I demonstrate this using Carnap’s metametaphysical position in his 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology' as an example, with regard to how it exhibits self-reference and results in inconsistency. I show how applying Carnap’s position to itself produces a dilemma, both horns of which lead to a contradiction. Such inconsistency commonly arises from meta-theories with global scope, as the 'meta' approach aims to transcend the scope of that which it is theorizing about, whilst the global nature will place itself back within the scope of that which it is theorizing about, which together result in the theory referring to itself whilst refuting itself. I argue that any global metametaphysical theory that draws a limit to thought will face self-reference problems leading to contradictory realms. My conclusion is conditional: If we want to meta-philosophize in such a way and treat quietist meta-theories as being true, then we need to be dialetheist and utilize a paraconsistent logic in order to accommodate the contradictions that result from such theorizing.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
FINMAD-3
Upload history
First archival date: 2017-11-11
Latest version: 1 (2017-11-11)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2017-04-11

Total views
1,868 ( #1,266 of 52,709 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
287 ( #1,172 of 52,709 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.