Responding to Normativity

In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 2. Clarendon Press. pp. 220--39 (2007)
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Abstract
I believe that normative force depends on desire. This view faces serious difficulties, however, and has yet to be vindicated. This paper sketches an Argument from Voluntary Response, attempting to establish this dependence of normativity on desire by appeal to the autonomous character of our experience of normative authority, and the voluntary character of our responses to it. I first offer an account of desiring as mentally aiming intrinsically at some end. I then argue that behaviour is only voluntary if it results from such aiming; hence all voluntary behaviour is produced by desire. Full-blooded responses to normativity, I then argue, are voluntary actions: motivation to act arises voluntarily from perception of reasons to act. This fits the desire-based model of normativity but not its rivals. However this argument concludes merely that our responses to normativity are desire-based. I end with some observations about how I think we can bridge the gap from the nature of response to normativity to the nature of normativity itself.
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Archival date: 2014-11-10
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References found in this work BETA
The Moral Problem.Smith, Michael
The Sources of Normativity.Korsgaard, Christine M.
Practical Reality.Dancy, Jonathan
The Myth of Morality.Joyce, Richard

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Citations of this work BETA
Reasons for Action: Internal Vs. External.Finlay, Stephen & Schroeder, Mark

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