The Cultivation of Virtue in Buddhist Ethics

Journal of Buddhist Ethics 20:667-701 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
One question pursued in Buddhist studies concerns the classification of Buddhist ethics. Damien Keown has argued that Aristotelian virtue ethics provides a useful framework for understanding Buddhist ethics, but recently other scholars have argued that character consequentialism is more suitable for this task. Although there are similarities between the two accounts, there are also important differences. In this paper, I follow Keown in defending the aretaic interpretative model, although I do not press the analogy with Aristotelian ethics. Rather, I argue that Buddhist ethics corresponds to a more generic, act-centered virtue ethics. Buddhist moral reasoning is often strikingly consequentialist, but I argue that this does not support the consequentialist interpretation. Analyzing the concept of right action must be distinguished from providing a justification for living a moral life and from formulating a procedure for making moral decisions.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
FINTCO-21
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-05-15
View other versions
Added to PP index
2018-05-15

Total views
642 ( #8,323 of 2,440,223 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
254 ( #1,868 of 2,440,223 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.