The Reasons that Matter

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):1 – 20 (2006)
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Abstract
Bernard Williams's motivational reasons-internalism fails to capture our first-order reasons judgements, while Derek Parfit's nonnaturalistic reasons-externalism cannot explain the nature or normative authority of reasons. This paper offers an intermediary view, reformulating scepticism about external reasons as the claim not that they don't exist but rather that they don't matter. The end-relational theory of normative reasons is proposed, according to which a reason for an action is a fact that explains why the action would be good relative to some end, where the relevant end for any ascription of reasons is determined by the speaker's conversational context. Because these ends need not be the agent's ends, Williams is wrong to reject the existence of external reasons. But contra Parfit, a reason for action is only important for an agent if it is motivationally internal to that agent.
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References found in this work BETA
The Moral Problem.Smith, Michael
.Shafer-Landau, Russ (ed.)
Moral Realism: A Defence.Shafer-Landau, Russ

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Citations of this work BETA
The Normativity of Rationality.Kiesewetter, Benjamin

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