What is (Correct) Practical Reasoning?

Acta Analytica 28 (4):471-482 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
This paper argues that practical reasoning is a mental process which leads a person from a set of existent mental states to an intention. In Section 1, I defend this view against two other proposals according to which practical reasoning either concludes in an action itself or in a normative belief. Section 2 discusses the correctness of practical reasoning and explains how the correctness of instrumental reasoning can be explained by the logical relations that hold between the contents of the mental states. In Section 3, I explore the correctness of normative practical reasoning. I conclude with the sceptical view that correct practical reasoning cannot require us to intend to do what we believe we ought to do.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2016-10-28
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
The Moral Problem.Smith, Michael
Morals by Agreement.Gauthier, David
The Moral Problem.Lenman, James
Moral Reasons.Dancy, Jonathan

View all 33 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
271 ( #16,473 of 49,999 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
38 ( #16,608 of 49,999 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.