Diagnostic Experimental Philosophy
Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):117-137 (2017)
Abstract
Experimental philosophy’s much-discussed ‘restrictionist’ program seeks to delineate the extent to which philosophers may legitimately rely on intuitions about possible cases. The present paper shows that this program can be (i) put to the service of diagnostic problem-resolution (in the wake of J.L. Austin) and (ii) pursued by constructing and experimentally testing psycholinguistic explanations of intuitions which expose their lack of evidentiary value: The paper develops a psycholinguistic explanation of paradoxical intuitions that are prompted by verbal case-descriptions, and presents two experiments that support the explanation. This debunking explanation helps resolve philosophical paradoxes about perception (known as ‘arguments from hallucination’).
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2017-02-13
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2017-02-13
Total views
214 ( #33,759 of 70,235 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
24 ( #34,846 of 70,235 )
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