On Interrogative Inquiries Without Suspended Judgement and Doxastic Neutrality

Dialogue (forthcoming)
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Abstract

It is a widespread idea that suspended judgement implies a state of doxastic neutrality. Jane Friedman has recently claimed that while inquiring into a given question, one suspends one’s judgement on it. Jointly considered, the previous claims imply that one is in a state of doxastic neutrality about a given question while inquiring into it. In this article, I explore the leading cases against Friedman’s perspective, arguing that it is debatable whether they exhibit inquiries into questions without doxastic neutrality. However, I will propose the possibility of “explorative disconfirmation inquiries” to show that doxastically non-neutral inquiries do exist.

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Leonardo Flamini
Universita' degli Studi di Pavia

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