God, Evil, and Alvin Plantinga on the Free-Will Defense

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (3):75--94 (2013)
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Abstract

In this paper we will give a critical account of Plantinga’s well-known argument to the effect that the existence of an omnipotent and morally perfect God is consistent with the actual presence of evil. After presenting Plantinga’s view, we critically discuss both the idea of divine knowledge of conditionals of freedom and the concept of transworld depravity. Then, we will sketch our own version of the Free-Will Defence, which maintains that moral evil depends on the misuse of human freedom. However, our argument does not hinge on problematic metaphysical assumptions, but depends only on a certain definition of a free act and a particular interpretation of divine omniscience.

Author Profiles

Ciro De Florio
Università Cattolica di Milano

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