Plurals and Mereology

Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (3):415-445 (2021)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In linguistics, the dominant approach to the semantics of plurals appeals to mereology. However, this approach has received strong criticisms from philosophical logicians who subscribe to an alternative framework based on plural logic. In the first part of the article, we offer a precise characterization of the mereological approach and the semantic background in which the debate can be meaningfully reconstructed. In the second part, we deal with the criticisms and assess their logical, linguistic, and philosophical significance. We identify four main objections and show how each can be addressed. Finally, we compare the strengths and shortcomings of the mereological approach and plural logic. Our conclusion is that the former remains a viable and well-motivated framework for the analysis of plurals.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
PhilPapers/Archive ID
FLOPAM
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-10-26
View other versions
Added to PP
2020-10-26

Downloads
154 (#43,659)

6 months
20 (#41,446)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?