Semantics and the Plural Conception of Reality

Philosophers' Imprint 14:1-20 (2014)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
According to the singular conception of reality, there are objects and there are singular properties, i.e. properties that are instantiated by objects separately. It has been argued that semantic considerations about plurals give us reasons to embrace a plural conception of reality. This is the view that, in addition to singular properties, there are plural properties, i.e. properties that are instantiated jointly by many objects. In this article, I propose and defend a novel semantic account of plurals which dispenses with plural properties and thus undermines the semantic argument in favor of the plural conception of reality
PhilPapers/Archive ID
FLOSAT-3
Revision history
First archival date: 2014-06-22
Latest version: 2 (2014-07-12)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Composition and Identities.Manuel Lechthaler - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Otago

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2014-06-19

Total views
270 ( #11,962 of 41,505 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
29 ( #20,538 of 41,505 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.