Achievement and Enhancement

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):322-338 (2020)
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Abstract
We engage with the nature and the value of achievement through a critical examination of an argument according to which biomedical “enhancement” of our capacities is impermissible because enhancing ourselves in this way would threaten our achievements. We call this the argument against enhancement from achievement. We assess three versions of it, each admitting to a strong or a weak reading. We argue that strong readings fail, and that weak readings, while in some cases successful in showing that enhancement interferes with the nature or value of achievement, fail to establish that enhancement poses an unusual threat to achievement.
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2020
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First archival date: 2019-08-13
Latest version: 2 (2019-12-11)
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