Asymmetrism and the Magnitudes of Welfare Benefits

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 15 (2):175-185 (2019)
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Abstract

One vexing question for Desire Satisfactionism is this: At what time do you benefit from a satisfied desire? Recently Eden Lin has proposed an intriguing answer. On this proposal – Asymmetrism – when past-directed desires are satisfied, the time interval during which you benefit is the time of the desire; and, when future-directed desires are satisfied, the time interval during which you benefit is the time of the object. In this essay, I argue that Asymmetrism forces us to give implausible answers to a different question: To what extent does a given satisfied desire benefit you?

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Andrew T. Forcehimes
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

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