Descartes and Hume on I-thoughts

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Self-consciousness can be understood as the ability to think I-thou-ghts which can be described as thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’. Self-consciousness possesses two specific correlated features: the first regards the fact that it is grounded on a first-person perspective, whereas the second concerns the fact that it should be considered a consciousness of the self as subject rather than a consciousness of the self as object. The aim of this paper is to analyse a few considerations about Descartes and Hume’s approaches to self-consciousness, as both philosophers introduce a first-personal method of accessing the subjective dimension through an introspective account. Descartes’s view on self-consciousness seems incapable of conceiving and recognizing herself as herself, while Hume’s seems to lack those features assigned to the consciousness of self-as-subject
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
FORDAH-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-12-07
View other versions
Added to PP index
2018-12-07

Total views
78 ( #37,493 of 51,658 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #25,955 of 51,658 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.