Rawlsian Justice: Reflections on a new Equilibrium

Abstract

This thesis considers the notion of intergenerational justice. I consider intertemporal justice largely through the lens of John Rawls’s theory of justice. Nonetheless, Rawls incorrectly gives priority to the principle of reciprocity in his theory. I correct Rawls’s misunderstanding concerning reciprocity. I also discuss the often-overlooked importance of natural duties to Rawls’s theory. I add the condition of vulnerability to Rawls’s circumstances of justice. By making these changes I give priority to impartiality in Rawls’s theory, remove the difficulties created by Rawls’s present-time-of-entry interpretation, remove the need for Rawls’s motivational assumption, and remove the chance-timing of a person’s birth as an arbitrary contingency and basis for bias in the decision-making of those behind the veil of ignorance.

Author's Profile

Monte Forster
University of Victoria

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2022-09-01

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