Lying, risk and accuracy

Analysis 77 (4):726-734 (2017)
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Almost all philosophers agree that a necessary condition on lying is that one says what one believes to be false. But, philosophers haven’t considered the possibility that the true requirement on lying concerns, rather, one’s degree-of-belief. Liars impose a risk on their audience. The greater the liar’s confidence that what she asserts is false, the greater the risk she’ll think she’s imposing on the dupe, and, therefore, the greater her blameworthiness. From this, I arrive at a dilemma: either the belief requirement is wrong, or lying isn’t interesting. I suggest an alternative necessary condition for lying on a degree-of-belief framework.
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Archival date: 2018-05-30
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Deception (Under Uncertainty) as a Kind of Manipulation.Krstić, Vladimir & Saville, Chantelle
Testimonial Worth.Peet, Andrew

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