Aesthetic Evaluation and First-Hand Experience

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):669-682 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
ABSTRACTEvaluative aesthetic discourse communicates that the speaker has had first-hand experience of what is talked about. If you call a book bewitching, it will be assumed that you have read the book. If you say that a building is beautiful, it will be assumed that you have had some visual experience with it. According to an influential view, this is because knowledge is a norm for assertion, and aesthetic knowledge requires first-hand experience. This paper criticizes this view and argues for an alternative view, according to which aesthetic discourse expresses affective states of mind, analogously to how assertions express beliefs. It is because these affective states require first-hand experience that aesthetic discourse communicates that such acquaintance is at hand. The paper furthermore argues that the lack of an experience requirement for aesthetic belief ascriptions constitutes a problem for the kind of expressivist who claims that evaluative belief states are covert non-cognitive states.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-06-08
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
184 ( #33,049 of 64,258 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #46,109 of 64,258 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.