# Aristotelianism in the Philosophy of Mathematics

*Studia Neoaristotelica*8 (1):3-15 (2011)

**Abstract**

Modern philosophy of mathematics has been dominated by Platonism and nominalism, to the neglect of the Aristotelian realist option. Aristotelianism holds that mathematics studies certain real properties of the world – mathematics is neither about a disembodied world of “abstract objects”, as Platonism holds, nor it is merely a language of science, as nominalism holds. Aristotle’s theory that mathematics is the “science of quantity” is a good account of at least elementary mathematics: the ratio of two heights, for example, is a perceivable and measurable real relation between properties of physical things, a relation that can be shared by the ratio of two weights or two time intervals. Ratios are an example of continuous quantity; discrete quantities, such as whole numbers, are also realised as relations between a heap and a unit-making universal. For example, the relation between foliage and being-a-leaf is the number of leaves on a tree,a relation that may equal the relation between a heap of shoes and being-a-shoe. Modern higher mathematics, however, deals with some real properties that are not naturally seen as quantity, so that the “science of quantity” theory of mathematics needs supplementation. Symmetry, topology and similar structural properties are studied by mathematics, but are about pattern, structure or arrangement rather than quantity.

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Citations of this work BETA

An Aristotelian Realist Philosophy of Mathematics: Mathematics as the Science of Quantity and Stucture.Franklin, James

Philosophy’s Loss of Logic to Mathematics.Park, Woosuk

Quantity and Number.Franklin, James

God and Abstract Objects: The Coherence of Theism: Aseity.Craig, William Lane

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