Can Multiple Realisation be Explained?

Philosophy 96 (1):27-48 (2021)
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Multiple realisation prompts the question: how is it that multiple systems all exhibit the same phenomena despite their different underlying properties? In this paper I develop a framework for addressing that question and argue that multiple realisation can be reductively explained. I illustrate this position by applying the framework to a simple example – the multiple realisation of electrical conductivity. I defend my account by addressing potential objections:contra Polger and Shapiro, Batterman, and Sober, I claim that multiple realisation is commonplace, that it can be reductively explained, but that it requires asui generisreductive explanatory strategy.

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Alexander Franklin
King's College London


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