Externalism and Marr's theory of vision
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (June):227-38 (1991)
Abstract
According to one brand of 'externalism', cognitive theories should individuate mental content 'widely'--that is, partly in terms of environmental features. David Marr's theory of vision is often cited in support of this view. Many philosophers (most notably, Tyler Burge) regard it as a prime example of a fruitful cognitive theory that widely individuates the representations it posits. I argue that, contrary to popular belief, Marr's theory does not presuppose an externalist view of mental content.
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2009-01-28
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17 ( #38,665 of 56,118 )
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