Externalism and Marr's theory of vision

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (June):227-38 (1991)
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Abstract

According to one brand of 'externalism', cognitive theories should individuate mental content 'widely'--that is, partly in terms of environmental features. David Marr's theory of vision is often cited in support of this view. Many philosophers (most notably, Tyler Burge) regard it as a prime example of a fruitful cognitive theory that widely individuates the representations it posits. I argue that, contrary to popular belief, Marr's theory does not presuppose an externalist view of mental content.

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Robert Francescotti
San Diego State University

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