High-Level Explanation and the Interventionist’s ‘Variables Problem’

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Abstract
The interventionist account of causal explanation, in the version presented by Jim Woodward, has been recently claimed capable of buttressing the widely felt—though poorly understood—hunch that high-level, relatively abstract explanations, of the sort provided by sciences like biology, psychology and economics, are in some cases explanatorily optimal. It is the aim of this paper to show that this is mistaken. Due to a lack of effective constraints on the causal variables at the heart of the interventionist causal-explanatory scheme, as presently formulated it is either unable to prefer high-level explanations to low, or systematically overshoots, recommending explanations at so high of a level as to be virtually vacuous
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2016
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FRAHEA-5
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First archival date: 2014-05-04
Latest version: 2 (2015-06-30)
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References found in this work BETA
Mental Causation.Yablo, Stephen

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Citations of this work BETA
Intervening Into Mechanisms: Prospects and Challenges.Kästner, Lena & Andersen, Lise Marie

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2013-01-17

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