Realization and Physicalism

Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):601-616 (2010)
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Abstract
Melnyk provides a rigorous analysis of the notion of realization with the aim of defining Physicalism. It is argued here that contrary to Melnyk's Realization Physicalism, the idea that mental phenomena are realized by physical phenomena fails to capture the physicalist belief that the former obtain in virtue of the latter. The conclusion is not that Physicalism is false, but that its truth is best explained with some notion other than realization in Melnyk's sense. I also argue that the problems with Melnyk's brand of Realization Physicalism generalize to other potential attempts to express Physicalism in terms of realization. The burden of proof is on the Realization Physicalist to show that physicalist intuitions can be adequately captured with the notion of realization
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Archival date: 2014-07-10
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Mental Causation.Yablo, Stephen

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2010-10-13

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