The Epistemic Consequences of Paradox

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (forthcoming)
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Abstract
By pooling together exhaustive analyses of certain philosophical paradoxes, we can prove a series of fascinating results regarding philosophical progress (yes, of a peculiar sort), agreement on substantive philosophical claims (yes, of a sort), knockdown arguments in philosophy (there are some, given here), the wisdom of philosophical belief (quite rare, because the knockdown arguments show that we philosophers have been wildly wrong about language, logic, truth, or ordinary empirical matters), the epistemic status of metaphysics (it’s not bullshit, and in one respect superior to many other philosophical fields), and the power of philosophy to refute common sense (yes, of a sort). As examples, I examine the Sorites Paradox, the Liar Paradox, and the Problem of the Many—although many other paradoxes can do the trick too.
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