Review of Metaphysics 69 (1):25-45 (2015)
AbstractA problem for Aristotelian realist accounts of universals (neither Platonist nor nominalist) is the status of those universals that happen not to be realised in the physical (or any other) world. They perhaps include uninstantiated shades of blue and huge infinite cardinals. Should they be altogether excluded (as in D.M. Armstrong's theory of universals) or accorded some sort of reality? Surely truths about ratios are true even of ratios that are too big to be instantiated - what is the truthmaker of such truths? It is argued that Aristotelianism can answer the question, but only a semi-Platonist form of it.
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