When Wanting the Best Is Bad

Social Theory and Practice 44 (1):95-119 (2018)
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Abstract
Here I call attention to a class of desires that I call exclusionary desires. To have an exclusionary desire is to desire something under a description such that, were the desire satisfied, it would be logically impossible for people other than the desiring subject to possess the desired object. Assuming that we are morally responsible for our desires insofar as and because they reflect our evaluative judgments and are in principle subject to rational revision, I argue that we should, morally speaking, alter both social structures and our individual psychologies to minimize, or at least substantially reduce, exclusionary desires.
ISBN(s)
0037-802X
PhilPapers/Archive ID
FREWWT-5
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Archival date: 2018-02-25
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2018-02-23

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