A Standing Asymmetry Between Blame and Forgiveness

Ethics (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Sometimes it is not one's place to blame or forgive. This phenomenon is captured under the philosophical notion of standing. However, there is an asymmetry to be explained here. One can successfully blame, even if one lacks the standing to do so. Yet, one cannot successfully forgive if one lacks the standing to do so. In this paper we explain this asymmetry. We argue that a complete explanation depends upon not only a difference in the natures of the standing to blame and forgive, but also a difference in the nature of blame and forgiveness themselves.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
FRIASA-11
Upload history
Archival date: 2022-01-08
View other versions
Added to PP index
2022-01-08

Total views
113 ( #44,607 of 65,655 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
113 ( #5,507 of 65,655 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.