A Standing Asymmetry between Blame and Forgiveness

Ethics 132 (4):759-786 (2022)
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Sometimes it is not one’s place to blame or forgive. This phenomenon is captured under the philosophical notion of standing. However, there is an asymmetry to be explained here. One can successfully blame, even if one lacks the standing to do so. Yet, one cannot successfully forgive if one lacks the standing to do so. In this article we explain this asymmetry. We argue that a complete explanation depends on not only a difference in the natures of the standing to blame and forgive but also a difference in the natures of blame and forgiveness themselves.

Author Profiles

Kyle G. Fritz
University of Mississippi
Daniel J. Miller
West Virginia University


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