Forgetting memory skepticism

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):253-263 (2020)
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Memory skepticism denies our memory beliefs could have any notable epistemic good. One route to memory skepticism is to challenge memory’s epistemic trustworthiness, that is, its functioning in a way necessary for it to provide epistemic justification. In this paper we develop and respond to this challenge. It could threaten memory in such a way that we altogether lack doxastic attitudes. If it threatens memory in this way, then the challenge is importantly self-defeating. If it does not threaten memory in this way, then the challenge leaves a foundation for an inference to the best explanation response, one we articulate and support.

Author Profiles

Matthew Frise
Milwaukee School of Engineering
Kevin McCain
University of Alabama, Birmingham


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