Internalism and the Problem of Stored Beliefs

Erkenntnis 82 (2):285-304 (2017)
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A belief is stored if it is in no way before the subject’s mind. The problem of stored beliefs is that of satisfactorily explaining how the stored beliefs which seem justified are indeed justified. In this paper I challenge the two main internalist attempts to solve this problem. Internalism about epistemic justification, at a minimum, states that one’s mental life alone determines what one is justified in believing. First I dispute the attempt from epistemic conservatism, which states that believing justifies retaining belief. Then I defend the attempt from dispositionalism, which assigns a justifying role to dispositions, from some key objections. But by drawing on cognitive psychological research I show that, for internalism, the problem of stored beliefs remains.
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First archival date: 2016-05-21
Latest version: 2 (2017-08-23)
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Knowing Without Evidence.Andrew Moon - 2012 - Mind 121 (482):309-331.

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