Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):643-661 (2017)
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Subject-sensitive invariantism posits surprising connections between a person’s knowledge and features of her environment that are not paradigmatically epistemic features. But which features of a person’s environment have this distinctive connection to knowledge? Traditional defenses of subject-sensitive invariantism emphasize features that matter to the subject of the knowledge-attribution. Call this pragmatic encroachment. A more radical thesis usually goes ignored: knowledge is sensitive to moral facts, whether or not those moral facts matter to the subject. Call this moral encroachment. This paper argues that, insofar as there are good arguments for pragmatic encroachment, there are also good arguments for moral encroachment.

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James Fritz
Virginia Commonwealth University


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