The reliability problem for reliabilism

Philosophical Studies 175 (4):923-945 (2018)
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According to process reliabilism, a belief produced by a reliable belief-forming process is justified. I introduce problems for this theory on any account of reliability. Does the performance of a process in some domain of worlds settle its reliability? The theories that answer “Yes” typically fail to state the temporal parameters of this performance. I argue that any theory paired with any plausible parameters has implausible implications. The theories that answer “No,” I argue, thereby lack essential support and exacerbate familiar problems. There are new reasons to avoid any reliability conditions on justification.

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Matthew Frise
Milwaukee School of Engineering


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