Abstract

This chapter traces the origins of Kant's perfectionism, and so of his moral law, to the formal conception of 'nature' that emerges from his reflection on the work of Wolff and Baumgarten. The conceptual preparation for this move turns upon two hinges, both of which trace to Baumgarten's subtle modifications of Wollffian perfectionism, namely, his fuller articulation of a non-consequentialist, internal morality of actions and what I call a 'hyper-Leibnizian' account of the idea and formal structure of nature itself. The fourth section shows how Kant discovers a new account of the a priori origin of this formal structure, which, when combined with his conception of unconditioned or transcendental freedom, allows him to locate an unconditioned, hence genuinely moral law, in freedom's lawlike unconditioned, intetentional imiposition of this same formal strcture, this homologia, on all its actions. In this way, the neo-Stoicism found in the earlier rationalist tradition, which bits us to 'live according to nature,' becomes in Kant the absolute duty to live according to reason's pure, a priori idea of a nature.