Stability in Liberal Epistocracies

Social Epistemology 37 (1):97-109 (2023)
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Abstract

In this article, I argue that stability is one of the enabling conditions for epistocratic arrangements to function well and justify their claim right to rule. Against this backdrop, I demonstrate that advocates of strategies to allocate exclusive decision-making power to knowledgeable citizens fail to demonstrate that in a context marked by the fact of pluralism, liberal epistocracies will be stable. They could argue that liberal epistocracies will be stable because epistocratic arrangements are better equipped than democratic decision-making bodies to produce outcomes that approximate the common good. They could argue that liberal epistocracies will be stable because there is a shared meritocratic set of values and ideas. Furthermore, they could opt for two standard liberal strategies, such as overlapping consensus and modus vivendi. Yet, in all cases, the argument for the stability of liberal epistocracies is not persuasive.

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Corrado Fumagalli
Università degli Studi di Genova

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