The Regress of Necessity and Its Structure

In Yannic Kappes, Asya Passinsky, Julio De Rizzo & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Facets of Reality — Contemporary Debates. Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 266-274 (2024)
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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that those relying solely on the transmissive model to explain necessity face a regress of necessity. I then argue that the regress of necessity is vicious due to explanatory failure because it fails to address the source question of necessity adequately. We have prima facie justification for this conclusion in the absence of positive arguments for necessity infinitism, which holds that an infinite chain of necessity could serve as the source of necessity. On pain of vicious regress, we should accept necessity foundationalism, which posits the existence of foundational box-truths (truths of the form □p) whose necessity is not explained by the necessity of further box-truths. Necessity foundationalism is motivated by the regress of necessity in a similar manner to justification foundationalism, which is motivated by the regress of epistemic reason.

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Yaokun Fu
University of Vienna

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