A Model-Invariant Theory of Causation

Philosophical Review 130 (1):45-96 (2021)
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I provide a theory of causation within the causal modeling framework. In contrast to most of its predecessors, this theory is model-invariant in the following sense: if the theory says that C caused (didn't cause) E in a causal model, M, then it will continue to say that C caused (didn't cause) E once we've removed an inessential variable from M. I suggest that, if this theory is true, then we should understand a cause as something which transmits deviant or non-inertial behavior to its effect.
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First archival date: 2018-06-18
Latest version: 11 (2019-11-24)
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