How to Learn from Theory-Dependent Evidence; or Commutativity and Holism: A Solution for Conditionalizers

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (3):493-519 (2014)
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Abstract

Weisberg ([2009]) provides an argument that neither conditionalization nor Jeffrey conditionalization is capable of accommodating the holist’s claim that beliefs acquired directly from experience can suffer undercutting defeat. I diagnose this failure as stemming from the fact that neither conditionalization nor Jeffrey conditionalization give any advice about how to rationally respond to theory-dependent evidence, and I propose a novel updating procedure that does tell us how to respond to evidence like this. This holistic updating rule yields conditionalization as a special case in which our evidence is entirely theory independent. 1 Introduction2 Conditionalization3 Holism and Conditionalization4 A Holistic Update5 HCondi and Dutch Books6 Commutativity and Learning about Background Theories6.1 Commutativity6.2 Learning about background theories7 In Summation

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J. Dmitri Gallow
University of Southern California

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