It Can Be Irrational to Knowingly Choose the Best

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Abstract
'Prediction-insensitive' causalists say that which choice is rational does not depend upon how likely you think you are to choose any of your available options. Jack Spencer presents an argument against prediction-insensitive causalists. He points out that they are forced to deny this principle: ''If you know that you will choose an option, x, and you know that x is better than every other option available to you, then it is permissible for you to choose x.'' Spencer is correct that prediction-insensitive causalists must reject this principle. However, he is incorrect insofar as he suggests that he and orthodox causalists are free to accept it. Both orthodox CDT and Spencer's own theory of rational choice are incompatible with the principle as well. It may be surprising to realise, but all are agreed: it can be irrational to knowingly choose the best.
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First archival date: 2021-08-03
Latest version: 4 (2021-08-09)
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