No one can serve two epistemic masters

Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2389-2398 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Consider two epistemic experts—for concreteness, let them be two weather forecasters. Suppose that you aren’t certain that they will issue identical forecasts, and you would like to proportion your degrees of belief to theirs in the following way: first, conditional on either’s forecast of rain being x, you’d like your own degree of belief in rain to be x. Secondly, conditional on them issuing different forecasts of rain, you’d like your own degree of belief in rain to be some weighted average of the forecast of each. Finally, you’d like your degrees of belief to be given by an orthodox probability measure. Moderate ambitions, all. But you can’t always get what you want.
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
GALNOC
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-09-03
View other versions
Added to PP index
2017-08-19

Total views
219 ( #29,065 of 64,107 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
29 ( #24,911 of 64,107 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.