Indifference to Anti-Humean Chances

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (5):485-501 (2022)
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An indifference principle says that your credences should be distributed uniformly over each of the possibilities you recognise. A chance deference principle says that your credences should be aligned with the chances. My thesis is that, if we are anti-Humeans about chance, then these two principles are incompatible. Anti-Humeans think that it is possible for the actual frequencies to depart from the chances. So long as you recognise possibilities like this, you cannot both spread your credences evenly and defer to the chances. I discuss some weaker forms of indifference which will allow anti-Humeans to defer to the chances.

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J. Dmitri Gallow
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (PhD)


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