Two Types of Ontological Frame and Gödel’s Ontological Proof

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The aim of this essay is twofold. First, it outlines the concept of ontological frame. Secondly, two models are distinguished on this structure. The first one is connected to Kant’s concept of possible object and the second one relates to Leibniz’s. Leibniz maintains that the source of possibility is the mere logical consistency of the notions involved, so that possibility coincides with analytical possibility. Kant, instead, argues that consistency is only a necessary component of possibility. According to Kant, something is possible if there is a cause capable of bringing it into existence; to this end consistency alone is not sufficient. Thus, while the Leibnizian notion of consistency is at the root of the concept of analytical possibility, the Kantian notion of possibility is the source of real possibility. This difference plays an important role in the discussion of Gödel’s ontological proof, which can be formally interpreted on the ontological frame of the pure perfections. While this proof, under some emendation condition, is conclusive in the context of Leibniz’s ontological model, it is not so within the Kantian one. This issue will be the subject of the second part of the present essay.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
GALTTO-4
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-03-14
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2013-12-19

Total views
57 ( #28,578 of 38,902 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
30 ( #14,418 of 38,902 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.