Belief’s minimal rationality

Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3263-3282 (2020)
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Abstract
Many of our beliefs behave irrationally: this is hardly news to anyone. Although beliefs’ irrational tendencies need to be taken into account, this paper argues that beliefs necessarily preserve at least a minimal level of rationality. This view offers a plausible picture of what makes belief unique and will help us to set beliefs apart from other cognitive attitudes.
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Archival date: 2019-11-17
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