Are Our Racial Concepts Necessarily Essentialist Due to Our Cognitive Nature?
APA Newsletter on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy 1 (19):19-24 (2019)
Abstract
Mallon and Kelly claim that hybrid constructionism
predicts, at least, that (1) racial representations are stable
over time and (2) that racial representations should vary
more in mixed-race cultures than in cultures where there
is less racial mixing. I argue that hybrid constructionism’s
predictions do not obtain and thus hybrid constructionism
requires further evidence. I argue that the historical record
is inconsistent with hybrid constructionism, and I suggest
that humans may not be innately disposed to categorize
people by race even though we are likely disposed to
categorize people into in and out groups. So, in this
paper, I show that there is an evidence set that is
inconsistent with hybrid constructionism.
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2020-04-24
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Recent downloads (6 months)
33 ( #23,392 of 57,075 )
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