De se thoughts and immunity to error through misidentification

Synthese 195 (8):3311-3333 (2018)
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Abstract
I discuss an aspect of the relation between accounts of de se thought and the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification. I will argue that a deflationary account of the latter—the Simple Account, due to Evans —will not do; a more robust one based on an account of de se thoughts is required. I will then sketch such an alternative account, based on a more general view on singular thoughts, and show how it can deal with the problems I raise for the Simple Account.
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Archival date: 2016-04-30
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2015-07-18

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