Necessity in singular causation

Philosophia 29 (1-4):149-172 (2002)
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I want to make sense of the view that singular causation involves a metaphysical necessary connection. By this I understand, where A and B are particulars, that ifA causes B then in every possible world in which A (or an A-indiscernible) or B (or a B-indiscernible) occurs, A (or an Aindiscernible) and B (or a B-indiscernible) occur. In the singularist approach that I will favour causal facts do not supervene on laws, causal relata are best understood as tropes, causation is founded on the nature of its terms, and the necessity thus involved does not entail essentialism, determinism, and other usual problems

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M. J. Garcia-Encinas
University of Granada


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