Nonconceptual modes of presentation

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Abstract
In a recent paper, Peacocke (2001) continues an ongoing debate with McDowell and others, providing renewed arguments for the view that perceptual experiences and some other mental states have a particular kind of content, nonconceptual content. In this article I want to object to one of the arguments he provides. This is not because I side with McDowell in the ongoing debate about nonconceptual content; on the contrary, given the way I understand it, my views are closer to Peacocke’s, and have been strongly influenced by him. It is just that I am not persuaded by the particular argument I will be questioning here.
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Archival date: 2016-05-01
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