On Anticipatory-Epistemic Injustice and the Distinctness of Epistemic-Injustice Phenomena

Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7 (10):48-57 (2021)
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Abstract

I present distinctness conditions that an epistemic-injustice phenomenon should meet to count as distinct from other such phenomena and I use these conditions to evaluate anticipatory-epistemic injustice’s distinctness in relation to testimonial smothering. Even though I argue that the phenomenon that Lee helpfully describes may not be distinct from testimonial smothering, I argue that the notion of distinctness itself should not be the primary or most important criterion that epistemic-injustice theorists use to determine whether such phenomena should feature in the literature. This implies that anticipatory-epistemic injustice and other phenomena like it should indeed feature in the epistemic-injustice literature because they promote epistemic-injustice theorists’ development of remedies and prescriptive theses in relation to epistemic injustice.

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Eric Bayruns García
McMaster University

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