Transference, or identity theories of causation?

Theoria 19 (1):31-47 (2004)
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Abstract

Transference theorists propose to explain causation in terms of the transference of a physical element. I argue, in two steps, that this is not possible. First, I show that available accounts of ‘transference’ ultimately convey that transference -and, consequently, causation- is the (non-relational) identity over time of the transferred element (a universal, a trope, or even an absolute substance). But, second, I try to defend, it is conceptually impossible that causation is (non-relational) identity

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M. J. Garcia-Encinas
University of Granada

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