An Argument Against the Possibility of Gettiered Beliefs

Logos and Episteme 5 (3): 265-272 (2014)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
In this paper, I propose a new argument against Gettier’s counterexamples to the thesis that knowledge is justified true belief. I claim that if there is no doxastic voluntarism, and if it is admitted that one has formed the belief that p at t1 if, at t0, one would be surprised to learn or discover that not–p, it can be plausibly argued that Gettiered beliefs simply cannot be formed.
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-01-06
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
197 ( #23,160 of 52,654 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #27,982 of 52,654 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.