An Argument Against the Possibility of Gettiered Beliefs

Logos and Episteme 5 (3): 265-272 (2014)
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In this paper, I propose a new argument against Gettier’s counterexamples to the thesis that knowledge is justified true belief. I claim that if there is no doxastic voluntarism, and if it is admitted that one has formed the belief that p at t1 if, at t0, one would be surprised to learn or discover that not–p, it can be plausibly argued that Gettiered beliefs simply cannot be formed.

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Benoit Gaultier
University of Zürich


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